Critical Readings in Political Economy: Deserts, Soils, and Colonialism

Critical Readings in Political Economy: Deserts, Soils, and Colonialism

Critical Readings in Political Economy: Deserts, Soils, and Colonialism

By : Max Ajl

Fazal Sheikh and Eyal Weizman, The Conflict Shoreline (Steidl, 2015); Diana Davis, The Arid Lands (MIT, 2016); Salvatore Engel-Di Mauro, Ecology, Soils, and the Left (Palgrave, 2014).

David G. Hogarth was a turn of the twentieth century archaeologist. He was also an archetype of the British Orientalist. In The Nearer East, a book which did excellent labor justifying colonial rule, he wrote that the nomads “impoverish the land [in Palestine] and lightly abandon it to denudation and sand-drift…The Bedawin [sic], born of the desert, becomes in turn its creator.” The causal claim was totally untrue. But it informed the ongoing takeover of Palestine. And similar kitsch is in use to justify the ongoing dispossession of those same Bedouins in al-Naqab – the Negev.

The Conflict Shoreline, a collaboration of Fazal Sheikh and Eyal Weizman, discusses this ongoing colonial usurpation of al-Naqab – the Negev, tracing it from the prestate period until the present. Sheikh’s contribution is a series of stunningly composed aerial photographs of the region – the beige and light brown of cleansed native settlements and military firing ranges – taken in the fall of 2011. Sometimes, the authors contrast the evidence from these photos with the black, white, and grey eraser smudges of British wartime aerial photography. Weizman’s written accompaniment is a forensic examination of the area. He charts shifts in its political ecology, and chronicles attempts to define the livable limits of that ecology.

The frontier between Israeli sovereignty and Bedouin land claims is “a seam between two climatic conditions,” the 200mm of annual precipitation isohyet, the minimum considered “arable” without irrigation, and that which is “desert.” Although the Bedouin have extensive technologies for irrigation using rainwater, “the threshold of aridity thereafter marked the border of a zone of expropriation within which the Bedouins were put completely at the mercy of the state and tolerated only as a matter of charity.”

The conversion of the Bedouin into objects of state charity, explains Weizman, was justified by a colonial narrative of decline in which the Arab conquest of the area led to the abandonment of agricultural settlements. But the Bedouin were the ones who had preserved long-standing local knowledge of low-rainfall agricultural technology, albeit using that technology at a lower level of intensity than during previous periods. The Bedouin had ignored Ottoman and British attempts to register their claims on the land. To register would have been to submit to the taxation of the central state. Such state evasion was a boon during attempts to avoid extractive exactions from the Ottomans, and then the British. But it became a burden during the colonial settlement, allowing Zionists to claim the Bedouin had no claims to the land. The colonizing project displaced 100,000 people from 1948-1953. It then justified this dispossession through the “dead lands” doctrine, according to which the land was non-arable because it was desert. QED.

A small lapse is that Weizman occasionally accepts international institutions’ concepts of desertification at face value. In The Arid Lands, Diana Davis offers a wide-ranging criticism of such notions. She expands on her previous groundbreaking work on the definition of deserts under French colonialism in North Africa. She here traces the genealogy of such notions of “desertification.” According to a metastatic notion common amongst colonizers, some developing states, and a great many of the global North-dominated international institutions, much of the world’s arid lands – thirty-five to fifty percent of the planet – are vulnerable to or undergoing “desertification.” This is supposedly due to overgrazing from pastoral people. During the colonial period, such notions justified expropriation of land on the grounds that roving nomads were not working it intensely enough. Another alibi was that they had entirely ruined previously forested regions.

Such thought took formal form in “dessication theory”: the notion that the inhabitants were responsible for the desert’s fall from afforested grace. Its upshot was that human improvement could restore these lands to fertility. Indeed, many sought to restore it to “productivity according to capital goals,” often by planting forests. In fact, as Davis shows, such forests damage the water table and do far more damage to these lands than the mélange of transhumanism and rainfall-dependent irrigation which traditional users of the land did and still do deploy.

The crucible for these ideas’ growth was the expansive growth of capitalism and colonialism, and the Lockean notion of improvement conferring ownership of land. Such notions justified enclosure at home and the great enclosure of colonialism abroad. But although Davis grounds this genealogy historically, sometimes an anti-Orientalist analytic lingers. She traces a textual thread of problematic Western notions of the desert, as though the idea was just waiting for material reality to allow it to flourish. This approach can border on a negative teleology. In any case, by the nineteenth century, amidst a drive to accumulate land, anti-nomad sentiment was omnipresent. Colonizers blamed nomads for the deserts and drylands which they sought to settle and conquer, from Tunisia and Algeria – as Davis has noted previously – to Palestine. Once declared bad for the land, traditional uses could be made increasingly illegal, opening the door for a legal justification for instituting private property rights and erasing “indigenous communal land tenure.”

Davis is the rare social scientist who has the gift of traversing the social-natural disciplinary boundary. Few who write on agriculture or political ecology ground themselves in the natural sciences as has Davis – although more of it could have made its way into the book. This question, of social scientists’ troubled engagement with the life sciences, is central to Salvatore Engel-Di Mauro’s difficult Ecology, Soils, and the Left. Engel-Di Mauro focuses on that thin substrate that makes human life and institutions of trade and power possible: the soil.

The book is a critical tour-de-force, informed by deep expertise in soil science. Thus armed, the author is prepared to disassemble the assumptions underlying the work of soil scientists’ and social scientists alike. He criticizes the former for their pretensions to value-neutrality and the latter for a lack of attention to the processes which “occur independently of humans’ understandings of them.”

One key contribution is the discussion of soil-preservation practices and alarmist notions of “peak soil,” a notion which flourished in the 2000s, referring to peaking amounts of arable land per person. Here the author illustrates the one-two punch of expertise in the relevant literature and a decolonial and anti-capitalist politic. He first shows how peak soil sidesteps human ability to both form and conserve soils. In turn, he suggests that “it would be more reasonable to learn from existing conservation practices and to facilitate their strengthening or diffusion in rune with ecosystems and social context.” This is a call for science, in effect, from the people, and the local and tacit knowledges they deploy in their everyday practice.

Another example of the author`s adeptness in multiple disciplines is his analysis of soil degradation. It happens, but what does that mean? For mainstream scientists, soil quality is good when it can support organisms, process exchanges of matter, and provide habitat. But as with the arid lands, what kind of habitat, and for whom? Desertification is by and large, actually a construct of value-laden science. Land great for grazing may be useless for high-input commercial farming, but often scientists simply assume that the land will be for the latter, and assess soil quality accordingly. But that assumption is only brought to light when one has unpacked the analyses and analyzed the metrics of mainstream science, an impossibility without an immersion in that science itself.

This does not mean an end to disciplines (or at least all disciplines) but means that we should read more science, a point Engel-Di Mauro elucidates by showing rather than telling – and doing so with rare, and occasionally overwhelming, depth.

Dead Sea Living

Dead Sea Living, directed by German Gutierrez. Canada/France/Palestine, 2013.

Although the Dead Sea has no life, it provides living through the rich minerals extracted from it. Yet the flood of water into the Dead Sea is slowly receding. It has witnessed a ninety-foot drop in only thirty years on a lake that is just sixty-seven kilometers long and twenty kilometers wide. At this rate, the Dead Sea will bottom out as a small pond in about fifty years.

German Gutierrez’s film Dead Sea Living depicts the dying of the Dead Sea and its economic, environmental, social, and political implications. Gutrierrez is a Colombian film director currently based in Canada who has made other documentaries, including the Coca Cola Case (2009), Who Shot my Brother? (2009), and Societies Under the Influence (1999). The original idea for Dead Sea Living came from Palestinian film director George Khleifi and other colleagues in 2009. In a recent interview, Khleifi said: “we witnessed the changing reality around the Dead Sea. We used to sit three steps away from the water of the Dead Sea on the terrace at the Lido Beach. Now, the sea receded six hundred to seven hundred meters and you cannot walk in that area as it is full of sinkholes. These six hundred to seven hundred meters are actually what used to be the bottom of the Sea.” He added that living in the region makes you aware of the water crisis, since water is under Israeli control and there are constant water cuts in the summer.[1] Khleifi wrote and pitched the original project and received support mainly from the European television network Arte and Radio Canada.

The documentary crosses traditional lines to reach audiences interested in the link between socioeconomic and political conditions and environmental sustainability. It also crosses geographic lines between the Israeli, Jordanian and Palestinian areas around the Dead Sea, shifting between photographing the main sites of the Dead Sea, Jordan River, and Sea of Galilee to interviewing officials, as well as, people whose daily lives are directly affected by the changes taking place.

The film portrays a stunning landscape of the Dead Sea and the surrounding areas. As the film’s photography employs panoramic and aerial imagery showing the rich ecological and historic context, it zooms into the political reality that is contributing to its obliteration. The film moves between narratives that invoke both biblical connotations as well as colonization and domination. It simultaneously contrasts life and death, the revival of the Dead Sea and its demise.

The dying of the Dead Sea is a result of the drying up of the Jordan River, which used to feed the Dead Sea from the Sea of Galilee. The Jordan River is believed to be the site of Jesus’ baptism. It attracts pilgrims from all over the world who come to both the Jordanian and the Israeli sides of the river to be baptized. But the Jordan River’s water, as Gidon Bromberg of Friends of the Earth Israel puts it in the film, “is anything but holy.” The water bottles sold at the Israeli baptism site have a warning label indicating that they are “for religious use only, do not drink.” This water, adds Bromberg, is a polluted mixture of sewage, brine, and runoff from fish farms and agricultural operations.

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[Image by Intuitive Pictures]

As countries in the region compete for fresh water, the Dead Sea has had the tap shut off from both ends.[2] In the north, Jordan, Syria, and Israel have cut off the Jordan River; in the south, two massive mineral extraction operations occupy the entire southern basin of the Dead Sea: the Arab Potash Company in Jordan and the Dead Sea Works in Israel. The Canada Potash Company is a shareholder in both. The film portrays how these mineral extraction industries are accelerating the rate of evaporation of the existing waters.

The Dead Sea is in fact one of the most profitable mines in the world. In addition, the resort and tourist businesses that have been recently established along its cost were created by the potash industry. The film ironically depicts how the tourism pools—where people come from all over the world to float in, and seek the health remedies of, the minerals of the Dead Sea—are nothing but a one-square-kilometer reservoir created by the nearby chemical plants.

The camera simultaneously shows naked women tanning in an Israeli Dead Sea resort alongside depictions of the plight of Palestinians who do not have enough water to survive, let alone enjoy the luxury of access to the Dead Sea.  Palestinian access to the area has been severely restricted since the early 1990s. According to the Oslo Accords, the Western aquifer in the West Bank is shared by Israel and the Palestinians, while the Eastern aquifer is exclusively Palestinian, though in fact it is totally controlled by Israel through the mechanisms of its occupation. Agriculture in the West Bank constitutes thirty to thirty-five percent of Palestinian GDP, and as a result, the Palestinian economy is much more vulnerable to a water shortage than Israel’s.[3] In comparison, the film portrays how sixty percent of Israel’s water goes to agriculture, for a revenue of two percent of its GDP, while Jordan uses seventy percent of its water for agriculture, for a revenue of approximately four percent of its GDP. Gidon Bromberg has noted in the film that it was “nonsensical” (and not sustainable) to grow bananas in the desert.

The film contrasts the conditions of the Palestinian farmers who are denied the right to dig wells with those in the Israeli settlements in the West Bank who are permitted to drill wells deep enough to tap the mountain aquifer. By blocking the Jordan River’s borders, Israel has also blocked the access to the river for Palestinian farmers from villages such as Bardala and Ein Al-Baida. Palestinians in the Jordan Valley villages must live on only fifty liters of water per day. That is about half of what the World Health Organization considers as the minimum for human sustainability. By contrast, Israelis on average have access to about 350 liters of water/day.[4]

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[Image by Intuitive Pictures]

In the film, Palestinian farmer Abu Saqr, from Al-Hadidiyeh in the Jordan Valley, indicates that the sonic bombs of the Israeli military destroyed a well for collecting rain and that he is prevented from fixing it. The camera immediately moves between Abu Saqr’s land and the neighboring Israeli settlement, Moshav Ro’i, where settlers plant flowers for export to Europe. While the cost of the water, subsidized by the Israeli government, is three Israeli New Sheqels (INS) per cubic meter for agriculture and seven to eight INS for home use at the settlement, Abu Saqr has to wait for two weeks for water delivery and pays twenty-seven INS per cubic meter. Uri Shani, who previously served as the head of the Water Authority in Israel, says in an interview in the film that in Area C, according to the Oslo Agreements, Palestinians need permission to dig, as they are “unfortunately under occupation.” Shaddad Attili, Minister and Head of the Palestinian Water Authority, complains in a subsequent scene that he cannot lay a simple pipe in the West Bank without permission from Israel.

The film vividly portrays how the Palestinians are the weakest side in any of the negotiations surrounding access to the Dead Sea and control of the water flowing into it. According to Khleifi, “The Oslo Agreements are clearly biased towards Israel and a number of mistakes were made by the Palestinians in the negotiations in regard to control over water."[5] He described to me the severe water shortages in the Hebron and Bethlehem areas and the draconian restrictions imposed by the Israeli Civil (read military) Administration in regard to digging wells. “The technicalities of the Israeli occupation in delaying authorizations for Palestinians to dig wells could lead to months, if not years, of delays, as every request needs to go through at least ten departments.”[6]

Dead Sea Living links the shrinking and disappearance of the Dead Sea with the overall problem of fresh water for people in the region. The film  ends by showing how politics and environmental protection policies are contested when attempting to find a solution to the Dead Sea problem. Environmentalists suggest restoring the Jordan River instead of creating canals that will connect the Red and/or Mediterranean Sea to the Dead Sea. This could prevent the unpredictable side effects of these new canals, and lead to more conservation policies in Jordan, Syria, and Israel that could in turn revive the Jordan River. Yet, as long as both Israel and Jordan are growing food and flowers for the supermarkets of Europe while draining the aquifers to do it, and while the mineral companies are draining the Dead Sea for short-term profit-making endeavors, conservation efforts will remain limited. Most importantly, as long as the Israeli occupation and building of settlements are in place , and as long as wars in Iraq and Syria continue to bring more refugees into Jordan, conservation policies will remain subordinated to geopolitical concerns.  The film clearly shows that any proposed solution has to take into account sustainability, not just to the Dead Sea and the Jordan River, but to the dignity of all people living in the area.

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[1] Skype interview by the author with George Khleifi, 7 October 2014.

[2] According to an interview in the film with Maysoon Zoubi, Secretary General of Water in Jordan, by 2025 Jordan would have exhausted all its reserves of ground water. Before 1948, Jordan had 3400 cubic meters per capita per year; now it is 145. Demand exceeds supply by two hundred percent.

[3] Background information for Dead Sea Living, 2013.

[4] Background information for Dead Sea Living, 2013.

[5] Skype interview by author with George Khleifi, October 7, 2014.

[6] In person interview by author with George Khleifi, July 27, 2014, Nazareth, Israel.